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The Editorial on the Research Topic
Causation and Causal Explanation in Psychiatry—Beyond Scientism and Skepticism
Since psychiatry firmly established itself as a scientific discipline, it has been propelled forward by 
the hope that the different diagnostic categories distinguished in clinical practice, will turn out to 
correspond to unique underlying causes. However, so far there is little evidence that disorders such 
as major depression or schizophrenia can be traced back to relatively simple, common causal trajec-
tories. Rather, the etiology of almost all mental disorders seems to be complex and multifactorial and 
to span different levels of explanation, ranging from (epi)genetic, neurobiological to psychological, 
and social levels.
Clinicians, broadly speaking, tend to be skeptical about the prospects of causal modeling in 
psychiatry, whereas scientists tend to cling to a scientistic and sometimes also reductionistic view on 
mental disorder. Psychiatry needs to find a way beyond skepticism and scientism, and this requires 
new methods and new conceptual approaches that enable us to gain a better insight into the com-
plexity of the causal processes leading to mental disorders.
This Research Topic discusses novel theoretical and empirical strategies addressing causation 
and causal explanation in psychiatry, in the context of a broader discussion of what science can 
and cannot contribute to the definition of mental disorder. Questions addressed are: how could the 
complexity of mental disorders be modeled and empirically investigated? Are traditional nomologi-
cal theories of causation the best framework for thinking about causation in psychiatry, or should 
we look at alternatives such as mechanism-based, interventionist, or pluralist theories of causation? 
How to integrate different levels of explanation in etiological models of mental disorder?
Dijkstra and de Bruin investigate to what extent it is justified to draw conclusions about causal 
relations between brain states and mental states from “traditional” cognitive neuroscience studies 
and brain stimulation studies. They argue that, depending on whether one adopts Woodward’s or 
Baumgartner’s interventionist account of causation, it is possible to draw causal conclusions from 
both types of studies (Woodward) or from brain stimulation studies only (Baumgartner). Also, they 
show what happens to these conclusions if we adopt different views of the relation between mental 
states and brain states.
Gijsbers reviews recent debates about the unity of science and explanatory pluralism, focusing on 
the tension between the integrative and the isolationist perspective: should the integrative tendencies 
in science be fully indulged in, or is a certain amount of isolation necessary? He argues that an 
important question is whether two true explanations of the same fact can ever fail to be combinable 
into one single explanation and shows that this can be the case when explanations have incompatible 
counterfactual consequences. He thus concludes that although interdisciplinarity may have many 
advantages, we should not take the project of integration too far.
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Causation and Causal Explanation
According to Hutto, philosophy of psychiatry faces a tough 
choice between two competing ways of understanding mental 
disorders. The folk psychology (FP) view puts our everyday nor-
mative conceptual scheme in the driver’s seat. Opposing this, the 
scientific image (SI) view holds that our understanding of mental 
disorders must come from the mind sciences. This paper rejects 
both the FP view (in its pure form) and the SI view, in its popular 
cognitivist renderings. It concludes that a more liberal version 
of SI can accommodate what is best in both views and provide a 
sound philosophical basis for a future psychiatry.
Thornton focuses on the idea that psychiatry contains, in 
principle, a series of levels of explanation—an idea that has been 
criticized as presupposing a discredited pre-Humean view of cau-
sation. These claims echo some superficially similar remarks in 
Wittgenstein’s Zettel. Thornton argues that attention to the context 
of Wittgenstein’s remarks suggests a reason to reject explanatory 
minimalism in psychiatry and reinstate a Wittgensteinian notion 
of levels of explanation.
Van Riel starts from the common assumption that social 
environment and cultural formation shape mental disorders. The 
details of this claim are, however, not well understood. His paper 
takes a look at the claim that culture has an impact on psychiatry 
from the perspective of metaphysics and the philosophy of sci-
ence. Its aim is to offer, in a general fashion, partial explications 
of some significant versions of the thesis that culture and social 
environment shape mental disorders and to highlight some of 
the consequences social constructionism about psychiatry has for 
psychiatric explanation.
Stein and Illes discuss the emergent field of global mental 
health, which has paid particular attention to upstream causal fac-
tors, for example, poverty, inequality, and gender discrimination 
in the pathogenesis of mental disorders. However, this field has 
also been criticized for relying erroneously on Western paradigms 
of mental illness. The authors argue that it is important to steer 
a path between scientism (disorders as essential categories) and 
skepticism (disorders as mere social constructions) and propose 
an integrative model that emphasizes the contribution of a broad 
range of causal mechanisms and the consequent importance of 
broad spectrum approaches to intervention.
Young presents a hybrid top-down, bottom-up model of the 
relationship between symptoms and mental disorder, viewing 
symptom expression and their causal complex as a reciprocally 
dynamic system with multiple levels, from lower-order symp-
toms in interaction to higher-order constructs affecting them. 
He concludes that symptoms vary over several dimensions, 
including: subjectivity, objectivity, conscious motivation effort, 
and unconscious influences, and discusses the degree to which 
individual (e.g., meaning) and universal (e.g., causal) processes 
are involved.
Bechtel reviews some of the compelling evidence of disrupted 
circadian rhythms in individuals with mood disorders (major 
depressive disorder, seasonal affective disorder, and bipolar dis-
order). While the evidence is suggestive of an etiological role for 
altered circadian rhythms in mood disorders, it is compatible with 
other explanations. In light of this, the paper advances a proposal 
as to what evidence would be needed to establish a direct causal 
link between disruption of circadian rhythms and mood disorders.
Bielczyk et al. integrate the literature on cognitive and physi-
ological biomarkers of MDD with the insights derived from math-
ematical models of brain networks. They propose a new approach 
called “circuit to construct mapping,” which aims to characterize 
causal relations between the underlying network dynamics 
(as the cause) and the constructs referring to the clinical symp-
toms of MDD (as the effect).
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